Chapter Computerised Passenger Reservation System of the Indian Railways

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Summary

A dynamic system such as the passenger reservation system is based on the

Text of the circular

Chapter 1 Computerised Passenger Reservation System of the Indian Railways 
 
 
1
Chapter 1 
Computerised Passenger Reservation System of the Indian 
Railways 
 
1.1 
Highlights 
Railways did not set out clear milestones or targets for the switch over 
from BSNL channels to their own OFC network. Even where the zonal 
railways had chalked out action plans, these were not adhered to and 
the progress of switch over was very slow. Railways continued to largely 
rely on hired BSNL channels with recurring expenditure towards 
hiring of the channels even though there were frequent and extensive 
failures of BSNL channels, disrupting the PRS services. There were also 
no service level agreements between the Railways and BSNL explicitly 
setting out the minimum guaranteed efficiency and penalties for failure 
and as a result the Railways did not have a structured redressal 
mechanism against BSNL. 
(Para 1.6.2) 
The PRS had design deficiencies necessitating manual interventions 
during program terminations and link failures. The Current Day 
Reservation System also posed problems and reservations to 
intermediate stations were not possible. The Coaching Refund System 
was not integrated with the PRS.   
(Para 1.6.3) 
General controls comprising system documentation, sound IT security 
practices, change management and structured disaster recovery policy 
were inadequate. There were deficiencies both in physical access and 
logical access controls. The total number of users with supervisory 
privileges was very high and booking clerks were also routinely 
assigned supervisory privileges, creating a risk of possible misuse of the 
powers associated with the privileges. 
(Paras 1.7.1 and 1.7.2)  
The mechanism of change management was inefficient and policy 
changes were not incorporated in the system software in a timely 
manner. There was no structured disaster recovery policy and the 
maintenance and protection of infrastructure as well as the data was 
inadequate.  
(Paras 1.7.3 and 1.7.4) 
Application controls were weak and a number of tickets were booked 
on fictitious details, indicating bogus/proxy booking in advance and 
thereby decreasing the availability of seats to genuine passengers. 
(Para 1.8.2) 
Validation checks for generation of pre-bought tickets, for journeys 
involving more than one lap, were weak. The system permitted 
generation of a zero value ticket for the second lap without generating

Report No.11 of 2007 (Railways) 
 
2
the ticket for the first lap. Seats/ berths were also blocked for dummy 
passengers using the pre-bought facility. 
(Para 1.8.3) 
The application software did not have validation checks to ensure 
compliance with the rules governing break journey. Various quotas for 
accommodation in trains were not properly managed resulting in 
decrease in availability of seats to the general public; this also resulted 
in loss of revenue to the Railways.  
(Paras 1.8.4 and 1.8.5) 
Fares and distances were incorrectly adopted leading to incorrect levy 
of fares. The electronic databases contained numerous deficiencies 
rendering the data unreliable.  
(Paras 1.8.6 to 1.8.8) 
Even though allotment of berths was meant to be a zero error process, 
multiple instances were noticed where the system allotted the same 
berths to different passengers.  
(Para 1.8.9) 
Trains and stations were incorrectly defined in the system thereby 
preventing reservation of accommodation against them. The status of 
late running of trains was not set promptly leading to incorrect refunds 
to passengers. 
(Paras 1.8.10 and 1.8.11) 
The internal control mechanism in respect of custody and utilisation of 
ticket rolls was weak and the ticket rolls were susceptible to misuse. 
(Para 1.9.2) 
1.2 Gist of recommendations  
• Railways should strengthen its communication network and reduce 
BSNL links to the bare minimum. Where BSNL links have to be 
continued for strategic reasons effective performance must be ensured 
through proper agree

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